Theories of language often make a distinction between semantics (linguistically-encoded meaning) and pragmatics (inferences about the speaker's communicative intentions). The boundary between these representations can be unclear and counter-intuitive. For example, most theorists argue that the semantic meaning of some encompasses the meaning of all while the intuition that some implies not all results from a pragmatic inference. We explored the semanticpragmatic interface by tracking how interpretation of some evolves during online comprehension. In an eye-tracking paradigm, participants heard instructions like "Point to the girl that has some of the ice cream sandwiches." Early eye-movements indicated that some was initially interpreted as compatible with all. However 800ms after the onset of some, participants began excluding referents compatible with all, suggesting that they had calculated the inference.
(1) Mother: Did you finish the ice cream sandwiches?
Child: I ate some of them.
Now imagine that you know that the child has in fact polished off the frozen novelties. Did she lie? Logicians would be inclined to say no -the child's statement is logically consistent with the fact that she ate all of the ice cream sandwiches. Ask the mother, however, and she would most likely disagree -if the child says she ate some of them, she is indicating that she didn't eat all of them. Who is correct in this situation?
Philosopher Paul Grice (1975) would have said that both of them are. In his seminal paper, Logic and Conversation, he argued for a division between the aspects of the interpretation that emerge from the meanings of words (semantics) and those that depend on inferential analysis of the speaker's communicative goals (pragmatics). This distinction sheds light on why terms like some have two different interpretations (Horn, 1989; Gadzar, 1979) . The logician's answer depends solely on the semantics of some which includes the meanings of stronger terms on the same scale (some and possibly all). In contrast, the mother's interpretation incorporates an additional upper boundary that excludes referents compatible with the maximal term (some but not all). This happens via a pragmatic inference called a scalar implicature. Here listeners adopt a Gricean expectation that if the child had eaten all of the frozen novelties, she would have simply said so. But since she did not, we can infer she must have eaten only a subset of them. unlikely that listeners would ever entertain the less common and less precise semantic meaning of a scalar term. Considerations such as these have led some to posit that these inferences are stored in the lexicon (Levinson, 2000) or generated directly by the grammar (Cheirchia, 2004) .
This view has received empirical support from psycholinguistic studies demonstrating listeners' rapid use of contextual cues to infer the speaker's intent (Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999) . In fact, the evidence that comprehension is rapid and incremental has been so persuasive that it has become implausible to many that any well-practiced comprehension process would show measurable delays (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; Altmann, & Kamide, 2004) .
Recent data however, suggests that scalar implicature may involve a slower, more effortful process (Rips, 1975; Noveck & Posada, 2003; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007) . For example, Bott and Noveck (2004) compared the response times for truth-value judgments of sentences like "Some elephants are mammals." Here participants' spontaneous judgments reveal how they have interpreted the sentence. If some is interpreted with respect to its semantic meaning, then the statement is true, however if the scalar implicature is added, then the statement becomes false. The authors found that participants who judged the statements to be false took longer than those who judged them to be true. However, while they attributed this difference to the time needed to generate the implicature, the use of sentence-final judgments times provide limited information about the processes that underlie the apparent delays.
Recently, we explored this question by presenting participants with commands like "Point to the girl that has some of the socks" and monitoring their eye-movements to displays featuring a girl with 2 of 4 socks and another with 3 of 3 soccer balls (Huang & Snedeker, in press ). In Nevertheless, we failed to find clear evidence that participants calculated the implicature online, raising questions about the sensitivity of the task. The present study seeks evidence for the hypothesized switch from a bare semantic analysis to a pragmatically-enriched one. We do so by extending the period of semantic ambiguity through the use of compound nouns pairs (e.g.,
ice cream sandwiches and ice cream cones). If semantic analysis precedes pragmatic inference, then we should again find an initial delay in looks to the referent when participants are asked for "some of the ice cream sandwiches." Critically, however, if a scalar implicature is generated during on-line comprehension, then we should see a reliable preference for the correct referent emerge prior to the final noun.
Methods

Participants
Twenty, English-speaking undergraduates at Harvard University participated in this study.
Materials and procedure
Participants sat in front of an inclined podium divided into four quadrant shelves. A camera at the center of the display recorded their direction of gaze. On every trial, the experimenter acted out a story in which two sets of items were divided among four characters.
These stories were followed by instructions like (2). (2) Point to the girl that has some/all/two/three of the ice cream sandwiches.
The number trials served as controls for the all and some trials, ensuring that any delay in reference resolution for some was not merely attributable to a preference to look at larger sets.
Since these terms do not require a pragmatic inference to restrict their reference, they did not generate the same temporary semantic ambiguity as some.
The visual displays featured characters arranged so that the vertically-adjacent characters matched in gender while the horizontally-adjacent characters did not ( Figure 1 ). For some and all trials, one set of four items was split between a horizontally-adjacent pair (boy with 2 vs. girl with 2) and another set of three items was given to one of the remaining children (boy with 0 vs.
girl with 3). For two and three trials, the first set was again evenly split between one boy-girl pair while the second set now included four items which were split unevenly between the two characters (boy with 1 vs. girl with 3). 1 A separate sentence completion task, Huang and Snedeker (in press) verified that these contexts were successful in establishing the expectations that (1) quantifiers would refer specifically to the sets in the display, (2) objects would be identified by basic-level labels, and (3) some would be interpreted with a scalar implicature.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The critical utterances differed only in the gender of the child that was requested and the identity of the final word. The character who was requested was called the Target (girl with ice cream sandwiches) while the one who matched in gender but had a different item was called the 1 This difference between the number and quantifier trials was necessary to ensure that the partitive construction was felicitous for all trial types. Adding an extra object to the character of opposite gender made the utterance "three of the socks" felicitous without changing the visual properties of the critical Target or Distractor characters. Distractor (girl with ice cream cones). The names of the two items were always compound nouns that shared the same two-syllable onset. The length of this period of ambiguity was determined by a gated-listening task (Tyler & Wessels, 1983) . We presented another group of 16 participants with 100ms incremental segments of the audio instructions. After each segment, they were asked to indicate whether they heard the Target or Distractor word. Participants correctly disambiguated the utterance 1400ms after quantifier onset (M=77%; t(15)=3.49, p<.01). Each item was rotated through the four quantifier conditions across presentation lists such that each list contained four items in each condition and each item appeared once in every list.
Results
Eye movements were coded by noting each change in gaze direction towards one of the quadrants or the center. Twenty-five percent of the trials were checked by second coder who confirmed the direction of fixation for 95% of the frames. This method produces data similar to that collected using head-mounted eye-tracking (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004) .
Our dependent measure was looking time to the Target as a proportion of looking time to the Target and the Distractor. This score ranged from zero (exclusive looks to the Distractor) to one (exclusive looks to the Target). Looks to the other characters accounted for less than 5% of fixations after onset of the gender cue. Each time window was analyzed with ANOVAs with Quantifier Scale (number vs. scalar) and Quantifier Strength (lesser vs. greater) as within-subject and item variables and list/item group as a between-subjects and items variable.
We first examined fixations during a baseline period from the onset of the gender cue to the onset of the quantifier (girl that has). This analysis provides a direct comparison of looks to Target and Distractor before the influence of the semantics of the quantifier. During this period, looks to the Target remained around chance for all terms, leading to no reliable effects of the 800ms time window, participants in the some trials were more likely to switch to the Target on the Distractor-initial trials than they were to switch to the Distractor on Target-initial trials.
Since these switches occurred well before the point of phonological disambiguation, we conclude that this Target preference demonstrates that the scalar implicature was calculated online during some of the trials.
Discussion
This study provides evidence of the dynamic interplay between semantic and pragmatic processes during real-time comprehension. We found that when lexical semantics is sufficient to identity a referent, disambiguation of the utterance is quite rapid. However, when pragmatic analysis is required -as in the case of some -reference resolution is substantially delayed. Under these circumstances, listeners initially access the semantic meaning of the term but fail to calculate the pragmatic inference. The pattern is rather remarkable given the preference for the scalar implicature in everyday communication and its robustness in our task. Nevertheless, about 600ms after the initial semantic effects, we found evidence that our listeners were able to calculate this pragmatic inference and resolve the referent of the temporally ambiguous noun.
These findings bear on current debates in the theoretical literature on the nature of pragmatic inferences and their relation to semantic representations. Here we discuss three classes of theories that are of particular interest for the psycholinguistic study of scalar implicatures. In the classic Gricean account, scalar implicatures result from a listener's postsentential reasoning about the kinds of utterances that a rational and cooperative speaker would produce (Grice, 1975) . More recently, Neo-Gricean theorists have suggested that habitual application of these robust inferences causes the implicated meaning to be stored in the lexicon and thus immediately available when the scalar term is encountered (Horn, 1989; Levinson, 2000) . In contrast, Relevance theory proposes that all pragmatic inferences, including implicatures, are guided by a more general tradeoff between the possible gains associated with generating an inference and the amount of cognitive effort necessary to derive it (Sperber & Wilson, 1986 /1995 . As a result, these inferences, however robust, will only be generated when they are required to meet the listener's internal standard of relevance.
Our data present a particular challenge to the automatic processes invoked in the NeoGricean theories: if scalar implicatures are lexicalized, then we might expect them to emerge as rapidly as semantic content. Yet we found a delay of 600ms between the use of the lexically encoded upper-bound of two and the pragmatically inferred upper-bound of some. Apparently, even the most robust pragmatic inferences take additional time to compute. The presence of an 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 counterfactual reasoning invoked by the Classical Gricean theory, our data suggests that they do so with remarkable speed. For Relevance theory, our data is somewhat puzzling. In our task, there was little to be gained by making the inference since the referent was always lexically disambiguated by the end of the sentence. The fact that the scalar implicature was nevertheless calculated might be reconciled with Relevance theory by assuming that this inference has a fairly low cost, perhaps because it is so frequently deployed.
How can we reconcile these results with evidence demonstrating that pragmatic processing influences interpretation early in comprehension (Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Frisson & Pickering, 1999) ? Clearly a complete synthesis awaits more data. In the meantime, we simply note the utility of distinguishing between two types of semantic-pragmatic interactions: (1) Cases in which pragmatic constraints are in place before a particular word is uttered, influencing how this word is understood and incorporated into the analysis; (2) Cases in which the meaning of a given word is critical for triggering the pragmatic inference. Many examples of the rapid pragmatic effects are phenomena of the first kind. Such findings are compatible with standard models of language processing in which pre-existing top-down constraints shape the perception and interpretation of lower levels of linguistic analysis (Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994; Altmann, 2001) . In contrast, our study focuses on an example of the second kind. Under most linguistic analyses a scalar implicature arises because of the meaning of the scalar term, thus it might be necessary to access that meaning before the inference can be calculated. In summary, the present study elucidates the nature of semantic and pragmatic interpretation by highlighting the relationship between these processes during real-time comprehension. Critically, evidence of a temporal lag between semantic processing and pragmatic processing suggests that while pragmatic inferences may be rapid, they are preceded by some degree of semantic analysis. Thus our data support and extend Grice's (1975) distinction between meaning and inference by demonstrating that the information provided by these distinct levels of interpretation becomes available at different moments during comprehension. In other words, some can be all and it cannot be all but just not at the same time. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48 
